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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1348
___________
TITO REYES,
Appellant
v.
RAYMOND SOBINA, Superintendent;
DEPUTY SUPT. BARONE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00067)
District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 11, 2009
Before: MCKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 26, 2009 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Tito Reyes, an inmate at SCI-Forest, appeals from an order of the District Court
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this pro se civil rights action.
For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

Reyes filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials
violated his constitutional rights by providing poor medical care regarding the removal of
his cataracts and by ordering him to work with hazardous chemicals in the kitchen after
his surgery. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Reyes had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To support the motion, the defendants submitted a
declaration from Christina Kennedy, the prison superintendent’s assistant, indicating that
Reyes had submitted only one grievance while incarcerated at SCI-Forest. That grievance
was dated January 31, 2008, and it was rejected as untimely because it related to work
issues from 2006 and 2007. According to Kennedy’s declaration, Reyes did not appeal
this decision. In his brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion, Reyes did not address
the issue of exhaustion or provide evidence that he had complied with the prison’s
grievance procedure; instead, he merely reiterated the merits of his case.
The Magistrate Judge treated the defendants’ motion to dismiss as one for
summary judgment and recommended that it be granted because Reyes had not exhausted
his administrative remedies in accordance with the PLRA.1 Reyes did not object to the
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“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Here, the defendants submitted evidence
with their motion to dismiss. In addition, the Commonwealth's Rule 12(b) motion invited
the District Court to convert it to a request for summary judgment if necessary.
Accordingly, Reyes was sufficiently on notice of the possible conversion to summary
judgment. See In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d
2

Magistrate Judge’s report. By order entered January 8, 2009, the District Court adopted
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and granted the defendants’ motion. Reyes then
filed a timely appeal.
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Summary judgment is
proper, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
inferences in favor of that party, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. Camp v.
Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2000).
The PLRA prohibits an inmate from bringing a civil rights suit alleging specific
acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials until he has exhausted available
administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[E]xhaustion is mandatory under the
PLRA and . . . unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 211 (2007). Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System, DC-ADM 804, requires a
prisoner to follow a three-step review process: An initial grievance must be submitted to

Cir. 1999). In any event, we note that Reyes responded to the Commonwealth's motion to
dismiss by submitting outside material of his own. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation made explicit the conversion to summary judgment, and
Reyes was given time to file objections. He did not. For the sake of completeness, we
note that—in some cases, anyway—it is acceptable to dismiss a prisoner's complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).
3

the Grievance Coordinator within 15 days after the events upon which the claims are
based. See DC-ADM 804, Part VI.A.8. If the Grievance Coordinator’s decision is
adverse to the inmate, it can be appealed to the local prison’s Facility Manager or
Superintendent. See DC-ADM 804, Part VI.C. Once the intermediate decision is made,
the inmate has 15 days from the date that the decision was received to file a final appeal
with the Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals. See DC-ADM 804, Part VI.D.
In support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants submitted a declaration
indicating that Reyes had “filed only one grievance while at SCI-Forest, on January 31,
2008, [that] [i]t was rejected as untimely because it related to work issues from 2006 and
2007, . . . [and] that [h]e did not appeal the rejection . . . .” Reyes did not present any
evidence to contradict the defendants’ claim that he had failed to comply with the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Under the circumstances, we
agree that Reyes failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial
question. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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